Pills, Polls, and Professors Redux by Lipton, Martin
Pills, Polls, and Professors Redux
Martin Liptont
September of this year will mark the twentieth anniversary of the
publication of my memorandum recommending that companies adopt
the poison pill, which I invented in the summer of 1982 to deal with
the takeover abuses that emerged in the 1970s and had become en-
demic by the end of the decade. The pill prevents a hostile tender offer
from being consummated unless and until the board of directors of
the target redeems the pill. The pill does not prevent a proxy fight to
remove and replace a board of directors that refuses to redeem the
pill. It was and is a fundamental aspect of the pill that a proxy fight is
the only way in which a raider can override a well-founded decision of
the board to reject and block a takeover bid. Now Professor Lucian
Bebchuk urges, in his brilliantly presented Article, that basic state cor-
poration law be changed to allow a raider to demand a shareholder
referendum whenever a board refuses to redeem a pill.1 This proposal
is one of several that have been advanced over the years to deny the
board of a target the ability to craft a strategy to protect corporate in-
terests in the context of a hostile takeover bid. In a rough chronologi-
cal sequence, the pro-takeover, anti-board-of-directors arguments
have been:
(1) The law should deny the board the power to be anything but
passive in the face of a takeover bid.2
t Partner, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, New York City. I am grateful to my colleagues
Laura A. McIntosh, Erin E. Quinn, and Paul K. Rowe for their significant contributions to this
Commentary, and to Wiliam T. Allen, Andrew R. Brownstein, John A. Elofson, Daniel A. Neff
Gregory N. Racz, Eric S. Robinson, Steven A. Rosenblum, William D. Savitt, Warren R. Stem,
Herbert M. Wachtell, and Jeffrey M. Vintner for their helpful comments. Portions of this Com-
mentary have been adapted from Martin Lipton and Paul K. Rowe, Pills, Polls, and Professors:A
Reply to Professor Gilson, 27 Del J Corp L (forthcoming 2002).
1 See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case Against Board Veto in Corporate Takeovers, 69 U
Chi L Rev 973 (2002). See also Lucian Arye Bebchuk and Allen Ferrell, A New Approach to
Takeover Law and Regulatory Competition, 87 Va L Rev 111 (2001) (proposing an optional body
of federal takeover law to help overcome the shortcomings of state takeover law).
2 See Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Man-
agement in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 Harv L Rev 1161,1194-95 (1981) (arguing that the
business judgment rule should never justify a decision to oppose a tender offer).
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(2) The law should deny the board the power to frustrate the
takeover bid, but permit the board to advise the shareholders as
to fairness and to seek a higher bid
(3) The pill is illegal.'
(4) A pill should require shareholder approval before it is effec-
tive.!
(5) Shareholders can initiate and adopt a bylaw amendment that
forces redemption of the pill and precludes adoption of a pill.
6
(6) Given that at least Delaware will probably hold that the
shareholder bylaw overruling the pill is not legal, shareholders
should initiate and adopt bylaw amendments that do not directly
3 See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Comment, The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Of-
fers, 95 Harv L Rev 1028, 1054 (1982) (concluding that, while management should not obstruct
tender offers, it should be allowed to look for other buyers and provide them information to fa-
cilitate competing bids); Ronald J. Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case
Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 Stan L Rev 819, 865-67 (1981) ("By providing in-
formation [to shareholders], management facilitates shareholder comparison of the value of the
target securities with the value of the tender offer."). See also European Parliament and Council
Directive on Company Law Concerning Takeover Bids (joint text approved by the Conciliation
Committee on June 5,2001).
4 See Amalgamated Sugar Co v NL Industries, Inc, 644 F Supp 1229,1234 (S D NY 1986)
(holding that a flip-in provision violated a New Jersey law that prohibited discrimination among
shareholders of the same class and series); Moran v Household International, Inc, 500 A2d 1346,
1356 (Del 1985) (rejecting the appellants' argument that the board of directors did not have the
power to adopt the poison pill and that the board may not usurp shareholders' right to receive
hostile tender offers); Bank of New York Co, Inc v Irving Bank Corp, 536 NYS2d 923 (NY Sup
Ct 1988) (granting a preliminary injunction preventing the defendant from exercising a flip-in
provision), affd, 533 NYS2d 412,143 AD2d 1075 (1988). See also Robert A. Helman and James 3.
Junewicz, A Fresh Look at Poison Pills, 42 Bus Law 771, 772 (1987) ("[lIt is clear that post-
Household there has been a growing skepticism as to the appropriateness of using a poison pill
plan to cut off shareholders from offers that might otherwise be made to acquire their stock at
above-market prices.").
5 See Jeffrey N. Gordon, "Just Say Never?": Poison Pills, Deadhand Pills, and Shareholder-
Adopted Bylaws: An Essay for Warren Buffett, 19 Cardozo L Rev 511, 549 (1997) (arguing that
shareholders should be able to adopt a bylaw that would establish a shareholder mechanism as a
precondition for the effectiveness of the pill).
6 See International Brotherhood of Teamsters General Fund v Fleming Companies Inc,
1999 OK 3, 975 P2d 907, 908 (concluding that Oklahoma state law allowed shareholders to pro-
pose bylaws that would restrict board implementation of shareholders-rights plans); Ronald J.
Gilson, Unocal Fifteen Years Later (and What We Can Do about It) at 21-28, Columbia Law and
Economics Working Paper No 177 (June 2000), available online at <http://papers.ssrn.com/
id=235417> (visited Jan 31, 2002) ("[S]hareholder-adopted bylaws largely (but not entirely) re-
turns [sic] to shareholders the decision making role with respect to tender offers that Household
International transferred to the board of directors."); Gordon, 19 Cardozo L Rev at 549 (cited in
note 5).
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overrule the pill, but make a takeover easier and takeover de-
fense more difficult.
7
(7) Professor Bebchuk's proposal to change the law to permit a
bidder-initiated referendum to remove the pill and all other
takeover defenses, which would be binding on all the sharehold-
ers if it received the support of a majority of the outstanding
shares of the target.8
This Commentary discusses the development of the law-
primarily Delaware law-governing takeovers, and against that back-
ground, rebuts Professor Bebchuk's referendum proposal. In a way,
this Commentary is the culmination of my efforts over a twenty-year
period in courts, legislatures, and academic publications to counter
those who would hang a permanent "For Sale" sign on all public com-
panies. I have sought to preserve the ability of the board of directors
of a target of a hostile takeover bid to control the target's destiny and,
on a properly informed basis, to conclude that the corporation remain
independent. I have never been able to understand the persistent re-
fusal of those academics who would hang a "For Sale" sign on public
corporations to recognize: (i) that there are very significant costs to
corporations in being managed as if they are continuously for sale;
and (ii) that there is simply no evidence at all that the damage, if any,
that the anti-pill academics attribute to the pill is greater than those
costs.
Prior to the 1960s, there was little academic discussion or judicial
or legislative focus on the legal rules that should apply to the response
by a corporation to a takeover bid. With the increase in takeover ac-
tivity in the 1970s, the topic became a growing concern for lawyers
who advised target corporations, but there was neither direct, cogent
case law nor meaningful academic debate. From the outset, it was
clear that there were three constituencies with prime interests in any
rule-shaping debate: (i) the shareholders, (ii) the corporation as an
operating entity, and (iii) the employees and other stakeholders.
Within each group, there were gradations of interests, and the groups
and interests overlapped and sometimes collided. In this period, the
role of the board of directors and the grounds on which it was to act in
responding to a hostile takeover bid were nebulous and had yet to be
definitively determined.
7 See John C. Coates IV and Bradley C. Faris, Second-Generation Shareholder Bylaws:
Post-Quickturn Alternatives, 56 Bus Law 1323, 1335 (2001) ("If shareholder bylaws are to have a
significant role in the future, they will need to be designed to do something other than effectively
overrule Moran's legalization of poison pills.").
8 See text accompanying note 74.
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In an effort to distill clarity from this confusion, in 1979 I wrote
what became the seminal article in the ensuing debate. In Takeover
Bids in the Target's Boardroom,9 I argued, based on my experience
during the 1960s and 1970s in advising boards of directors of corpora-
tions that were the targets of hostile takeover bids, that the directors
should be governed by the business judgment rule and that in exercis-
ing their judgment they should be able to take into account the inter-
ests of employees, communities, and other constituents, as well as the
long-term (and not just the short-term) interests of the shareholders.
This position was quickly rejected by academics opposed to an
active board role in the hostile takeover context, who argued for the
so-called "Rule of Passivity," relegating directors to the role of passive
observers proscribed from any action other than giving advice to the
shareholders. A classic series of articles ensued, '° with the courts decid-
ing the debate in favor of the business judgment rule." This exchange
9 Martin Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom, 35 Bus Law 101, 130 (1979)
(outlining in detail the proper role for a board facing a takeover bid).
10 See, for example, Bebchuk, Comment, 95 Harv L Rev at 1054 (cited in note 3) (arguing
that although incumbent management should be barred from actions that obstruct any tender of-
fer, management should diligently seek a higher offer); Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R.
Fischel, Takeover Bids, Defensive Tactics, and Shareholders' Welfare, 36 Bus Law 1733, 1745-46
(1981) (arguing that decisions as to tender offers do not involve management of the
corporation's affairs in any meaningful sense and can be made by the shareholders); Easterbrook
and Fischel, 94 Harv L Rev at 1199-1201 (cited in note 2) (defending their proposal of director
passivity in response to tender offers by distinguishing between the board's role in tender offers
and its role in other situations); Martin Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom: An
Update after One Year, 36 Bus Law 1017, 1021-26 (1981) (reemphasizing the importance of the
procedures used by the board in considering a takeover bid); Gilson, 33 Stan L Rev at 878-79
(cited in note 3) (arguing that in the face of a tender offer, management of the target company
should take no action other than to (1) disclose information bearing on the value or
attractiveness of the offer, and (2) seek out alternative transactions which it believes may be
more favorable to target shareholders); Leo Herzel, et al, Why Corporate Directors Have a Right
to Resist Tender Offers, 3 Corp L Rev 107, 109-10 (1980) (arguing that board resistance to a
tender offer may benefit shareholders by driving up the price); Martin Lipton, Takeover Bids in
the Target's Boardroom:A Response to Professors Easterbrook and Fischel, 55 NYU L Rev 1231,
1233 (1980) ("As long as the economic benefits of takeovers are debatable, rejection or
acceptance of a tender offer should continue to be left to the business judgment of the target's
board."); Martin Lipton and Andrew Brownstein, Takeover Responses and Directors'
Responsibilities: An Update, ABA Natl Inst on the Dynamics of Corp Control 7 (Dec 1983)
(noting that boards must consider the nature of a takeover bid and its effect on the corporate
enterprise, including the adequacy of the price, the nature and timing of the offer, the impact on
constituencies other than shareholders, the risk of nonconsummation, and the quality of the
securities being offered in the exchange). See also Martin Lipton, Takeover Abuses Mortgage the
Future, Wall St J 16 (Apr 5, 1985) (claiming that the threat of hostile takeover forces companies
to sacrifice long-term growth for short-term profitability); Martin Lipton, Boards Must Resist,
NY Tunes 2F (Aug 9,1981) (criticizing Easterbrook and FischeI's analysis).
11 See Panter v Marshall Field & Co, 646 F2d 271,293-95 (7th Cir 1981) (declining to apply
a different test in the context of takeovers); Johnson v Trueblood, 629 F2d 287, 292-93 (3d Cir
1980) ("[W]e believe that under Delaware law, at a minimum the plaintiff must make a showing
that the sole or primary motive of the defendant was to retain control."); Crouse-Hinds Co v In-
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of articles reflected a fierce public policy debate. The new breed of
hostile bids was, on the one hand, wreaking havoc with expectations of
managers, employees, and communities, and, on the other, enriching
the raiders and a new class on Wall Street: the bankers who advised,
financed, or arbitraged takeovers. The pro-takeover forces found
theoretical support for their position among a group of economists
who adhered to the efficient market theory, which was argued to offer
support for the proposition that shareholder wealth could be maxi-
mized by outlawing most forms of takeover defenses. Starting from
the premise that share prices at all times accurately reflect the intrin-
sic value of a corporation, efficient market theory partisans contended
that the willingness of a bidder to offer a premium price reflects the
bidder's ability to manage the assets better or more efficiently. 2 At the
same time, they contended that board reluctance to accept a premium
price necessarily reflects an instinct of self-preservation rather than
conviction that the tender price is inadequate. Defenses, in this view,
serve only to entrench incumbents and necessarily to harm sharehold-
ers.
The opponents of the efficient market theory pointed out that
corporations were not chartered by the states solely to maximize
shareholders' short-term gains, 3 and that large corporations could not
function in an environment where they were continuously "for sale.''
The aggregate costs to all shareholders of all public companies, if they
had to operate on this basis, would far exceed the costs, if any, in the
long-run to the shareholders of companies that successfully resist un-
solicited takeovers. Those who did not accept the relevance of the effi-
cient market theory to the regulation of takeovers also pointed out,
drawing on a growing body of economic literature, that inefficiencies
terNorth, Inc, 634 F2d 690, 702-03 (2d Cir 1980) (noting that a complaining shareholder must
present evidence of the directors' self-interest in order to shift the burden of proof to the board);
Unocal Corp v Mesa Petroleum Co, 493 A2d 946 (Del 1985) (concluding that the business judg-
ment rule should apply when the board addresses a pending takeover bid); Kahn v MSB Ban-
corp, Inc, 1998 Del Ch LEXIS 112, *7 (applying the business judgment rule to the board's deci-
sion to reject a merger offer), affd, 734 A2d 158 (Del 1999).
12 See, for example, Easterbrook and Fischel, 94 Harv L Rev at 1182-83 (cited in note 2)
(arguing that tender offers increase social welfare by moving productive assets to higher valued
uses and to the hands of better managers).
13 For a very different view of the corporation, see Margaret M. Blair and Lynn A. Stout,
A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 Va L Rev 247 (1999).
14 Corporation law is designed to protect the "long-term value of capital committed in-
definitely to the firm" William T. Allen, Ambiguity in Corporation Law, 22 Del J Corp L 894,
896-97 (1997), and does not share the short-term horizon of takeover arbitrageurs. See also Mar-
tin Lipton and Steven A. Rosenblum, A New System of Corporate Governance: The Quinquen-
nial Election of Directors; 58 U Chi L Rev 187, 189 (1991) (arguing "that the ultimate goal of
corporate governance is the creation of a healthy economy through the development of business
operations that operate for the long term and compete successfully in the world economy").
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in the market could exist at any given point in time, meaning that
share prices did not always reflect intrinsic values."
Those in favor of takeover defenses further argued that a central
assumption of efficient market theory proponents-that shareholder
responses to tender offers are necessarily informed decisions that ra-
tionally reflect the supposed "best" interests of all shareholders collec-
tively-is not true. Tender offers are not the functional equivalents of
free votes, since the decision not to tender (whether into an all-cash,
all-shares offer or a two-tier, front-end-loaded offer) carries with it
economic risks and detriments; not knowing whether the mass of
other shareholders will tender or not, the individual holder faces the
classic "prisoner's dilemma" and is effectively stampeded into tender-
ing. The proponents of takeover defenses also observed that many
hostile bids were opportunistic attempts to buy assets on the cheap,
and that there was no empirical evidence that such takeovers were al-
ways (or ever) good for the economy. 6 Moreover, the view that direc-
tors were only capable of acting in their self-interest was unsupported
by empirical evidence and inconsistent with the assumptions underly-
ing the structure of American corporate law.'7
15 See Lipton and Rosenblum, 58 U Chi L Rev 198-99 (cited in note 14) (relying on this
literature to criticize the efficient market theory).
16 See, for example, John Pound, The Promise of the Governed Corporation: The Limits of
Economic Solutions, 73 Harv Bus Rev 89, 91 (1995) ("Many takeover bids themselves represent
flawed decisions by the acquirer."); Martin Lipton, Corporate Governance in the Age of Finance
Corporatism, U Pa L Rev 1, 23 (1987) ("The advent of the highly leveraged takeover, and the de-
fensive responses to it, have forced companies to focus on short-term profitability rather than on
capital investment, long-term planning, research, and development."); Richard L. Stem and Ed-
ward E Cone, Scarlett O'Hara Comes to Wall Street, Forbes 37-38, 40 (Sept 21, 1987) (reporting
competition to provide financing for leveraged acquisitions and suggesting that valuations were
driven up to insupportable levels); Edson Spencer, The U.S. Should Stop Playing Poker with Its
Future, Bus Week 20 (Nov 17, 1986) (arguing that Wall Street has adopted the view that "the
higher the stock price, the better the management has done its job," leading managers "to put
short-term earnings growth before such interests as market development, product quality, re-
search and development, and customer and employee satisfaction"); Harold M. Williams, It's
Time for a Takeover Moratorium, Fortune 136 (July 22, 1985) (commenting that takeover activity
has resulted in a loss in management effectiveness that "works against corporate and national
productivity, the wages of employees, and returns to stockholders. It undermines our economy
and our society."); Jonathan P. Charkham, Keeping Good Company: A Study of Corporate Gov-
ernance in Five Countries 219,229 (Oxford 1994) (arguing that putting great emphasis on share-
holders' immediate values may result in competitive disadvantage compared to other nations'
systems that take a longer-term view). See also Allen D. Boyer, Activist Shareholders, Corporate
Directors, and Institutional Investment: Some Lessons from the Robber Barons, 50 Wash & Lee L
Rev 977, 1004-05 (1993) (explaining that as LBOs increased and junk bonds became popular, a
new group of investors entered and expanded the market for low-grade debt).
17 See, for example, 8 Del Code Ann § 141(a) (1991) (providing that the business and af-
fairs of every Delaware corporation shall be managed by a board of directors). This is an emi-
nently sensible state of affairs; among other advantages, directors have much better (nonpublic)
information and far lower costs of communication than do shareholders.
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State legislatures around the country resolved this debate
squarely in favor of directorial discretion. Between 1968 and 1982,
laws designed to slow or halt the wave of opportunistic takeover activ-
ity were enacted in thirty-seven states."' Thus, by the early 1980s, both
the legislatures and the courts had emphatically rejected the view that
directors should be passive in the face of takeover bids.'9 But in 1982,
by a razor-thin margin, the United States Supreme Court invalidated
the "first generation" of antitakeover statutes in Edgar v MITE Corp. 2
Now there was nothing to delay the consummation of a tender offer
beyond the Williams Act's twenty business days.1 Increasingly, boards
turned to creative attempts to release short-term value by selling
pieces of the business or turning to a "white knight," but these alterna-
tive transactions were often difficult to achieve on the truncated time-
line of the Williams Act minimum tender period.
The MITE decision coincided with the decision of most institu-
tional investors that they would not vote for charter amendments de-
signed to deter or regulate hostile takeovers and with the federal
courts picking up on an earlier decision by Judge Henry Friendly in
which he treated with great skepticism suits brought by targets raising
antitrust, disclosure, and similar claims to enjoin hostile bids.2 This left
the playing field heavily tipped in favor of the corporate raiders and
peddlers of junk bonds. In September 1982, I published a memoran-
dum describing the "Warrant Dividend Plan.2'' The "warrant" of the
Warrant Dividend Plan was a security that could be issued by the
board of directors of a target company (before or after it was faced
with an unsolicited bid) that would have the effect of increasing the
18 See Grant A. Gartman, State Takeover Laws Appendix B-5 (Investor Responsibility Re-
search Center 2000).
19 See note 11.
20 457 US 624,632-34 (1982) (plurality) (concluding that the WNilliams Act struck a careful
balance between the interests of offerors and target companies, and that any state statute that
"upset" this balance was preempted).
21 15 USC §§ 78g, 781-78n, 78s (1994).
22 See Missouri Portland Cement Co v Cargill Inc, 498 F2d 851 (2d Cir 1974) (Friendly)
(holding that the target of the tender offer had failed to demonstrate the probability of success
on its antitrust claims against the potential acquirer). See also Scientific Computers Inc v Edu-
data Corp, 599 F Supp 1092,1098 (D Minn 1984) ("Nor should employee morale or an increase
in management anxiety be a basis for injunctive relief"); American General Corp v NLT Corp,
1982 US Dist LEXIS 9690, *70 (S D Tex) (quoting Cargill for the statement that "district judges
should take arguments of serious harm to a corporation due to jitters in executive suites with a
fair amount of salt"); Raybestos-Manhattan Inc v Hi-Shear Industries, 503 F Supp 1122, 1134
(E D NY 1980) (citing Cargill for the proposition that "[t]he Second Circuit has warned district
courts to look skeptically on Clayton Act claims raised by target management who become vigi-
lant enforcers of the antitrust laws only when a tender offer threatens their control").
23 Martin Lipton, memorandum, Warrant Dividend Plan (Sept 15, 1982) (on file with au-
thor).
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time available to the board to react to an unsolicited bid and allowing
the board to maintain control over the process of responding to the
bid. Beginning at the end of 1982, in various forms it was used success-
fully by targets of hostile bids to gain time and maximize shareholder
value. Six months later, in 1983, the plan was given its unfortunate
nickname by an investment banker who had nothing to do with its
creation. When asked by a Wall Street Journal reporter what to call a
security-modeled on the Warrant Dividend Plan-issued on my ad-
vice by Lenox, Inc. to defend against a hostile tender offer, this banker
responded flippantly, "a poison pill."N
By whatever name, the pill's arrival was remarkably timely. As
the tide of junk-bond-financed, bootstrap bids, sometimes linked to
two-tier, front-end-loaded tenders, rolled on in the mid-1980s, there
was increasing recognition that something was needed to redress the
balance between the corporate raider and the board of the target. The
pill met precisely that need. Nevertheless, those who believed that di-
rectors should play no active role in the hostile takeover context
viewed the introduction of the pill as a radical innovation, and the at-
tacks on the pill's validity were unrelenting."
The increasing use of the pill in 1984-85 set the stage for a deci-
sive confrontation between the forces advocating a free hand for cor-
porate raiders and those supporting the traditional model of the cor-
poration and the business judgment rule. The question remained: Who
would act as the decisionmaker? At the federal level, Congress had
shown no interest in adopting a statutory framework for regulating
takeovers beyond the Williams Act; and by 1983 the federal impulse
for further regulation, even at the SEC level, had petered out. The
United States Supreme Court in Santa Fe Industries, Inc v Green2 had
extinguished the ability of federal judges to federalize substantive
24 Frank Allen and Steve Swartz, Lenox Rebuffs Brown-Forman, Adopts Defense, Wall St J
2 (June 16,1983) ("Lenox's strategy already is being referred to on Wall Street as 'the poison-pill
defense."').
25 See, for example, Helman and Junewicz, 42 Bus Law at 771 (cited in note 4) (suggesting
that the poison pill may be invalid or financially inconsequential); Jonathan Shub, Shareholder
Rights Plans-Do They Render Shareholders Defenseless against Their Own Management?, 12
Del J Corp L 991, 993 (1987) (arguing that a board's unilateral adoption of a poison pill usurps
the right of shareholders to decide whether to sell their stock to a purchaser); Galvin Stevenson,
A Poison Pill That's Causing a Rash of Lawsuits, Bus Week 54 (Apr 1,1985) (noting SEC opposi-
tion to the poison pill used in Household); Ralph C. Ferrara and William J. Phillips, Opposition to
'Poison Pill' Warrants Is Mounting, Legal Times 13 (Oct 15,1984) (warning directors to do "some
long, hard thinking" about poison pills before adoption); Kim Masters, Poison Pill Takeover De-
fense Stirs Controversy, Uncertainty, Legal Times 1 (Aug 29, 1983) (discussing whether the poison
pill strategy is an effective antidote to two-tiered takeover bids).
26 430 US 462 (1977).
1044 [69:1037
Pills, Polls, and Professors Redux
takeover law through the securities laws27 On the other hand, the
Court's opinion in MITE had limited the ability of state legislatures to
impose their own statutory regulation in the area.2' Meanwhile, in-
creasing corporate reliance on defensive tactics-and the increasingly
shrill objections of their opponents-created a pressing practical need
for dependable legal ground rules. The state courts were left as the
only institutional actors with the power and will to fashion a compre-
hensive resolution.
In 1985, the Delaware Supreme Court decided four cases-Smith
v Van Gorkom,0 Unocal Corp v Mesa Petroleum Co,0 Revlon, Inc v
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, and Moran v Household Interna-
tional, Inc--that created the framework that has governed takeover
law ever since. The key choices Delaware made in 1985 were the
following:
(1) In Van Gorkom, Delaware decisively rejected the efficient
market theory and not only permitted, but required, directors to
make takeover-related decisions based on an informed view of
the "intrinsic" value of the corporation-not the value assigned
by the stock market.'
(2) In Unocal, citing with approval a later version of my 1979 ar-
ticle, Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom, ' Delaware ac-
cepted the utility and appropriateness of "takeover defenses" and
the board of directors' discretion to deploy such defenses, but
announced that henceforth they would be reviewed under an en-
hanced business judgment rule-a tougher and objective "rea-
27 Id at 479 ("Absent a clear indication of congressional intent, we are reluctant to federal-
ize the substantial portion of the law of corporations that deals with transactions in securities,
particularly where established state policies of corporate regulation would be overridden.").
28 See note 20 and accompanying text. The states were, however, active in reversing several
federal court rulings that the pill was invalid under state corporate statutes. Every court ruling
invalidating pills was legislatively overturned. See, for example, NY Bus Corp Law § 505(a)(2)
(West 1990) (overturning a July 1988 New York State Supreme Court decision invalidating Ir-
ving Bank's flip-in poison pill, see Irving Bank, 536 NYS2d at 925-26); NJ Rev Stat Ann § 14A:7-
7 (vest Supp 2001) (overturning an August 1986 New York federal district court case applying
New Jersey corporate law, which invalidated NL Industries' flip-in poison pill, see Amalgamated
Sugar, 644 F Supp at 1234).
29 488 A2d 858 (Del 1985).
30 493 A2d 946 (Del 1985).
31 506 A2d 173 (Del 1986). The Delaware Supreme Court decided Revlon in 1985, although
its opinion was issued in 1986.
32 500A2d 1346 (De11985).
33 See 488 A2d at 875-76 (referring to the use of only market price to determine that a
premium was adequate as "faulty" and "fallacious").
34 See 493 A2d at 955, citing Lipton and Brownstein, Takeover Responses at 7 (cited in note
10).
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sonable in relation to the threat posed" test, rather than the pre-
existing subjective business judgment rule.'
(3) In Revlon, Delaware required directors to maximize short-
term value once they decided to sell a company for cash; and
conversely, Delaware decided that it would not require directors
to maximize short-term value outside this one, relatively narrow
situation. Delaware companies were not required to be for sale
twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, and directors could
agree to friendly stock mergers without putting the company "in
play" or having to "auction" the company.6
(4) In Household, Delaware permitted boards to adopt the poi-
son pill as a structural defense to a takeover bid. Household rec-
ognized that the pill gave boards the power to "just say no" until
such time as the shareholders (if they so wished) replaced the in-
cumbent directors, and established that judicial review of a
board's use of the poison pill would be subject to the enhanced
business judgment rule standard of Unocal.
31
Clearly, these four crucial decisions represented a set of compro-
mises. Delaware accepted neither the pleas of corporate constituen-
cies for continued application of the deferential business judgment
rule to takeover defense, nor endorsed the demands of corporate
raiders and academics who sought to outlaw takeover defense. In-
stead, Delaware chose a middle ground: Takeover defenses were
permitted, but they were to be judged, in common law fashion, under
a fact-intensive, case-by-case analysis in which the directors would
effectively bear the burden of showing not only their good faith, but
also the "reasonableness" of their chosen response.
Put to the practical test during the half-decade of intense hostile
takeover activity that ensued, the new Delaware paradigm has worked
well. Contrary to the fears of both sides, Unocal and its siblings did not
35 493 A2d at 954-55,957.
36 See MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc v Revlon, Inc, 501 A2d 1239, 1248 (Del Ch
1985) (referring to the use of only market price to determine that a premium was adequate as
"faulty" and "fallacious"). Although this implication of Revlon was reasonably clear from the
opinion, the efficient market partisans refused to acknowledge it as Delaware doctrine until the
Delaware Supreme Court had the opportunity to make it an express holding four years later in
Paramount Communications, Inc v Time Inc, 571 A2d 1140, 1150 & n 12 (Del 1989) ("ime-
Warner") (holding that a corporate board of directors "is not under any per se duty to maximize
shareholder value in the short term, even in the context of a takeover"). Moreover, the court
stated that "it is not a breach of faith for directors to determine that the present stock market
price of shares is not representative of true value." Id.
37 See Household, 500 A2d at 1354.
1046 [69:1037
Pills, Polls, and Professors Redux
usher in a period in which every takeover defense was either con-
demned automatically or rubber-stamped. A review of some of the
major cases of that period demonstrates the suppleness of the stan-
dard and the discriminating manner in which it was applied.3
Of the quartet of 1985 decisions, the one that proved to have the
greatest practical impact was undoubtedly Household.39  The pill
changed everything. Instead of twenty business days under the Wil-
liams Act, boards now had sufficient time to consider, respond to, and
craft alternatives to unsolicited bids. And, contrary to the arguments
of the plaintiffs in Household,' the pill actually revived the impor-
tance of proxy contests as a means of determining a corporation's fu-
ture. Indeed, the Delaware courts rarely receive the credit they de-
serve for having been right in rejecting the supposed factual, empirical
arguments made by the pill's opponents in Household as to the pre-
dicted effect of the pill on proxy contests. Professors and experts were
paraded in the Court of Chancery to testify, among other things, that
validation of the pill in Delaware would suppress proxy contests.
41
Both the Court of Chancery and the Delaware Supreme Court re-
fused to let themselves be persuaded by these "experts" - and of
course with hindsight we can see that the pill simply did not usher in
the parade of horribles predicted by its opponents. As the Chancery
Court correctly predicted, the pill did not spell the doom of proxy con-
tests.2 A recent review of the economic literature on the shareholder-
wealth effects of takeover defenses was undertaken by Professor
John Coates.43 He concluded:
38 See, for example, Ivanhoe Partners v Newmont Mining Corp, 535 A2d 1334, 1344 (Del
1987) (upholding a special dividend issued to facilitate a "street sweep" to defeat a two-tier of-
fer); Robert M. Bass Group, Inc v Evans, 552 A2d 1227,1247 (Del Ch 1988) (enjoining restructur-
ing adopted in response to unsolicited bid); ACAcquisitions Corp v Anderson, Clayton & Co, 519
A2d 103,115-16 (Del Ch 1986) (enjoining recapitalization adopted in response to hostile bid).
39 See Stevenson, Rash of Lawsuits, Bus Week at 58 (cited in note 25):
This is probably the single most important corporate law case to come before the courts in
years.... Legal challenges [to the pill] have proliferated [throughout the United States]....
But the [Household] case in Delaware is the crucial one. Because so many companies are
incorporated there, and because the court is widely respected, its decision will set the tone
for rulings in other state and federal courts.
40 Plaintiffs in Household, 500 A2d at 1355, argued that the pill's restriction upon individu-
als or groups from first acquiring more than 20 percent of shares before waging a proxy contest
would reduce the potency of proxy contests. Even the SEC filed an amicus curiae brief in sup-
port of this argument. Id at 1346,1351.
41 See Moran v Household International Inc, 490 A2d 1059, 1079 (Del Ch 1985).
42 See id at 1080 ("On the evidence presented it is highly conjectural to assume that a par-
ticular effort to assert shareholder views in the election of directors or revisions of corporate pol-
icy will be frustrated by the proxy feature of the Plan.").
43 John C. Coates IV, Empirical Evidence on Structural Takeover Defense: Where Do We
Stand?, 54 U Miami L Rev 783 (2000).
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Delaware courts should take some comfort from the fact that
they resisted strong academic arguments and political efforts that
attempted to push them to dramatically repudiate pills and other
structural defenses. The empirical case against defenses remains
unproven, and, without empirical support, the theoretical case
against defenses is not as compelling as it might have seemed to
hostile commentators [in 1989]."
The new rules crafted by the Delaware courts in the four 1985
decisions met with wide acceptance. Corporate raiders did not aban-
don the market for corporate control;5 corporations did not seek to
reincorporate out of Delaware in order to avoid the new regime;" and
litigators increasingly chose the Delaware state forum over federal
and non-Delaware state courts when there was a need for adjudica-
tion. Interestingly, the pill even became a standard feature in initial
public offering charters, a context in which management entrench-
ment is virtually absent.7
But the 1985 Delaware rules were controversial enough-and
perceived as insufficiently sensitive to the realities of corporate life-
to provoke a legislative reaction in other states. It is a signal fact that,
despite Delaware's primacy as a corporate domicile and despite some
academic criticism of Delaware as too protective of management," the
44 Id at 797. In view of this conclusion by Professor Coates, it is difficult to understand his
seeming endorsement of shareholder-initiated bylaws that would curtail defenses against hostile
takeovers. See Coates and Faris, 56 Bus Law at 1373 (cited in note 7).
45 The Delaware Supreme Court noted in Barkan v Amsted Industries, Inc, 567 A2d 1279,
1287 (Del 1989):
[T]he spate of takeover litigation ... readily demonstrates that such 'poison pills' do not
prevent rival bidders from expressing their interest in acquiring a corporation.... Because
potential bidders know that a pill may not be used to entrench management or to unfairly
favor one bidder over another, they have no reason to refrain from bidding if they believe
that they can make a profitable offer for control of the corporation.
46 See Robert Daines, Does Delaware Law Improve Firm Value? at 1, NYU Center for Law
and Business Working Paper No 99-011 (1999), available online at <http://papers.ssrn.com/
id=195109> (visited Apr 30,2002).
47 See Robert Daines and Michael Klausner, Do IPO Charters Maximize Firm Value?
Antitakeover Provisions in IPOs, 17 J L, Econ, & Org 83,95 (2001) (reviewing charter provisions
in over three hundred companies that went public between 1994 and 1997, and finding no single
provision that prohibited or limited the use of poison pills).
48 There is a growing body of academics that views Delaware corporation law as, on bal-
ance, highly successful. See, for example, Marcel Kahan and Edward D. Rock, How I Learned to
Stop Worrying and Love the Pill: Adaptive Responses to Takeover Law, 69 U Chi L Rev 871,873
(2002) (stating that the pill helped contribute to a new equilibrium that "transformed the pill
into a device that plausibly is in shareholders' interest and, in any event, one that shareholders
can easily live with"); Daines, Does Delaware Law Improve Finn Value? at 35 (cited in note 46)
("On average and over time, investors pay more for the assets of publicly held firms governed by
Delaware corporate law."); Marcel Kahan, Paramount or Paradox: Delaware Supreme Court's
Takeover Jurisprudence, 19 J Corp L 583, 606 (1994) (characterizing Delaware law as "plausible
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Delaware regime has not been broadly embraced by the other states.
Instead, a number of states enacted legislation that to a greater or
lesser extent rejected the Delaware compromise as too favorable to
corporate raiders and hostile bids,9 too suspicious of the motives of di-
rectorsns and too unresponsive to the legitimate interests of nonshare-
holder constituencies such as employees and communities. No Ameri-
can jurisdiction went further than Delaware and adopted rules, either
by statute or judge-made law, that restrict takeover defenses more
tightly than Delaware. No American jurisdiction has ever adopted a
framework for takeover law based on the efficient market theory or
gone farther than Delaware in that direction.
If anything, after 1985 there was a growing realization that the ex-
treme simplicity of the world view of the anti-board partisans-that
there was no place for any interference with the presumed "right" of
shareholders to sell the company at any time to a bidder opposed by
the board, and that directors should therefore be "passive instrumen-
talities"-was neither an accurate description of reality nor a desir-
able goal. Moreover, in 1987, the United States Supreme Court, which
in 1982 had rejected states' efforts to regulate takeovers through so-
called "first generation" statutes, effectively switched sides and en-
dorsed "second generation" statutes in CTS Corp v Dynamics Corp of
America." The 1987 market "break," and the 1990 collapse of Drexel
Burnham Lambert, the most prominent financier of hostile bids in the
1980s, further damaged the prestige and persuasiveness of the efficient
market theory.
and intelligible"). See generally Roberta Romano, The Genius of American Corporate Law (AEI
1993).
49 See, for example, Ind Code Ann §§ 23-1 to 35-1(f) (West Supp 2001) (Standards of Con-
duct for Directors), which rejects the Unocal compromise as being "inconsistent with the proper
application of the business judgment rule under this article. Therefore, the general assembly in-
tends ... to protect both directors and the validity of corporate action taken by them in the good
faith exercise of their business judgment after reasonable investigation." When the Supreme
Court upheld Indiana's control share acquisition statute in CTS Corp v Dynamics Corp ofAmer-
ica, 481 US 69, 94 (1987), the Court ushered in a new era in state activism regarding takeovers.
See, for example, 805 ILCS 5/8.85 (West 1998) (stating that a board may consider the effect of
congressional action on employees, supplies, and customers); NJ Rev Stat Ann § 14A:7-7 (West
2001) (stating that the judgment of the board is conclusive in issuing rights and options); NY Bus
Corp Law § 717(b) (West 1986); Ohio Rev Code Ann § 1701.59(E) (West 1994 & Supp 2001)
(stating that a director may consider the interests of shareholders, employees, suppliers, and cus-
tomers when determining what is best for the corporation).
50 Unocal seemed to assume that the perks of outside directorship are substantial enough
to cause independent directors to be less trustworthy in making takeover-related decisions than
garden-variety business decisions. See Unocal, 493 A2d at 954-55. 1 am aware of no research or
evidence on this point. It is certainly not self-evident.
51 481 US 69,94 (1987) (holding that the Indiana control share acquisition statute was a le-
gitimate exercise of state authority, and that it did not conflict with federal tender offer regula-
tion).
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It is perhaps outside the terms of academic argument, but none-
theless suggestive, to recall the subsequent careers of the bidders
whose takeover proposals were opposed by boards in some of the
high profile cases of the 1980s. For example, the board of Macmillan,
Inc. was harshly criticized by the Delaware courts for opposing Robert
Maxwell's 1988 bid for the company. But in light of the revelations of
dishonesty, corporate looting, and other wrongdoing that followed
Maxwell's presumed suicide in 1991, does the Macmillan board now
look quite so unreasonable in preferring a 20 cent per share lower bid
from Maxwell's rival Henry Kravis? While the Maxwell and Macmil-
lan transaction is perhaps the most thought-provoking example, is
there anything in the subsequent business careers of such raider icons
of the 1980s as Boone Pickens, Carl Icahn, Paul Bilzerian, and Robert
Campeau that suggests that corporate law should have been redes-
igned to put these people in charge of important enterprises and large
pools of assets?
In 1988, Delaware adopted its own "second generation" statute.
This enactment is Delaware's only major legislative response to the
takeover issue, and clearly represents a further rejection of the effi-
cient market theory. Under Section 203,S directors have the statutory
power effectively to block potential transfers of control to substantial
shareholders by refusing to approve a transaction. While this power is
not absolute, it can be overridden only by a very high "supermajority"
of 85 percent of the shareholders; Section 203 is in effect a statutory
pill that can be neutered by a tender offer that attracts 85 percent of
the shares. Like the 1985 cases, Section 203 is another Delaware com-
promise, but clearly one that recognizes that directors should have a
major role in determining the corporation's fate in a takeover situa-
tion.53
Events of the 1990s have further demonstrated the wisdom of the
Delaware compromise. The coercive, highly leveraged, and often
destructive attributes of the 1980s takeover market have faded from
view. Secure in their ability to resist hostile bids, directors have used
this authority to enhance shareholder value. And directors can use this
same power to resist a transaction they reasonably believe to be insuf-
52 8 Del Code Ann § 203 (1991).
53 But see In re Aquila, Inr, Shareholders Litigation, 2002 Del Ch LEXIS 5: In re Siiconix,
In, Shareholders Litigation, 2001 Del Ch LEXIS 83. Though these two cases encourage boards
of directors (by insulating them from shareholder litigation claims) to pass decisions on takeover
proposals directly to shareholders, both cases involve special circumstances and do not indicate a
departure from Delaware's general policies. Nothing in either decision purports to change the
duties of directors in situations where board action is required.
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ficient or unduly speculative4'-a power of no mean significance,
wielded for the protection of the interests of shareholders and, indeed,
every corporate constituency. Confirming the position I first advanced
in 1979 in Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom, the American Law
Institute-in Principles of Corporate Governance-endorsed Dela-
ware's takeover jurisprudence as a model for the nation.
5
1
54 Former Chancellor Allen, Vice Chancellor Jacobs, and Vice Chancellor Strine of the
Delaware Chancery Court make the following observation in their Article in this Symposium:
"Judges suspect that it is relatively easy for management to hire an investment banker, and to
coax a CFO to crank up earnings projections, that will justify the board's rejection of a higher-
priced takeover offer in favor of continuing the status quo or approving a lower-priced friendly
deal" William T. Allen, Jack B. Jacobs, and Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Great Takeover Debate:A Medi-
tation on Bridging the Conceptual Divide, 69 U Chi L Rev 1067, 1092 (2002). After forty-five
years of advising companies and their boards of directors in connection with both unsolicited
takeover proposals and friendly negotiated acquisitions, I am convinced that it is in connection
with the latter, and not the former, that management and their investment banker advisors are
frequently overly optimistic. That is why more than half the mergers that have taken place in the
past thirty years did not meet expectations and resulted in a significant transfer of wealth from
the shareholders of the acquirors to the shareholders of the acquirees. See Sanjai Baghat, Andrei
Shleifer, and Robert W. Vishny, Hostile Takeovers in the 1980s: The Return to Corporate Speciali-
zation, Brookings Papers on Econ Activity: Microecon (1990); Michael C. Jensen and Richard S.
Ruback, The Market for Corporate Contro" The Scientific Evidence, 11 J Fin Econ 5, 22 (1983).
The opposite is the case with unsolicited takeover bids. In the vast majority of cases-I am hard-
pressed to name more than one or two in my experience-the management of the targets and
their investment bankers, warned by their lawyers that their analyses, deliberations, and final de-
termination would be scrutinized in litigation, are quite conservative in their projections and
valuations. I do not share the judges' skepticism. Further, it is worth noting that in addition to the
high premia paid in hostile takeovers, the damage inflicted on the targets, see text accompanying
notes 13-15, raises costs and interferes with successful post-acquisition integration so that they
are even more injurious to the shareholders of the acquirors than friendly acquisitions. My ex-
perience in several thousand acquisitions leads me to the conclusion that the acquisitions that
make the most sense and generally benefit both sets of shareholders, and the economy as a
whole, are "mergers of equals," in which there is no premium and both sets of shareholders share
in the synergies and other benefits of the combination in accordance with their proportionate in-
terests. If a radical change in the law relating to mergers is warranted, I would argue that protec-
tion against interlopers seeking to break up a merger of equals is where we should focus. If the
academic critics of the business judgment rule and the pill do in fact believe that takeovers and
mergers are beneficial to the economy, I would think that they would support such change.
55 See Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations § 6.02 at 405
(ALl 1994):
§ 6.02. Action of Directors that Has the Foreseeable Effect of Blocking Unsolicited
Tender Offers.
(a)The board of directors may take an action that has the foreseeable effect of blocking an
unsolicited tender offer [§ 1.39], if the action is a reasonable response to the offer.
(b) In considering whether its action is a reasonable response to the offer:
(1) The board may take into account all factors relevant to the best interests of the cor-
poration and shareholders, including, among other things, questions of legality and
whether the offer, if successful, would threaten the corporation's essential economic
prospects; and
(2) The board may, in addition to the analysis under § 6.02(b)(1), have regard for inter-
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In the same vein, it warrants notice that Delaware's two major
structural features with respect to takeover law-the poison pill and
Section 203-have not given rise to significant case law since the
Household case. While the Household Court announced in 1985 the
standard- Unocal-under which pill decisions were to be reviewed,
there have been only three Delaware Chancery Court decisions re-
quiring a board of directors to redeem a pill, two of which were later
disapproved by the Delaware Supreme Court in Time-Warner.M The
only case in which a board of directors was found to have breached its
fiduciary duties in connection with its application of Section 203 in-
volved the improper waiver of the protections of Section 203 by the
directors of a majority-owned subsidiary.57 The absence of such case
law strongly suggests that both the pill and Section 203 are being util-
ized responsibly by Delaware boards and that the system they uphold
is a healthy one.m After twenty years, I can confidently say that the pill
has been used; it has not been abused.
ests or groups (other than shareholders) with respect to which the corporation has a le-
gitimate concern if to do so would not significantly disfavor the long-term interests of
shareholders.
(c) A person who challenges an action of the board on the ground that it fails to satisfy the
standards of Subsection (a) has the burden of proof that the board's action is an unreason-
able response to the offer.
(d) An action that does not meet the standards of Subsection (a) may be enjoined or set
aside, but directors who authorize such an action are not subject to liability for damages if
their conduct meets the standard of the business judgment rule [§ 4.01(c)].
56 The Chancery Court decisions in City Capital Associates Ltd Partnership v Interco, Inc,
551 A2d 787 (Del Ch 1988), and Grand Metro PLC v Pillsbury Co, 558 A2d 1049 (Del Ch 1988),
were disapproved by the Delaware Supreme Court in Tune-Warner, 571 A2d at 1152-53 (refer-
ring to Interco's reading of the Unocal standard as "narrow" and "rigid"). The only other Chan-
cery Court decision requiring a target to redeem a poison pill was in the context of a completed
auction of the company in which the two highest bids were on the table and the court found that
no corporate purpose would be served by maintaining a poison pill to preclude the possible con-
summation of a $90.25-per-share bid in favor of a $90.05 deal supported by the target. See Mills
Acquisition Co v Macmillan Inc, 1988 Del Ch LEXIS 138, *56-57, revd on other grounds, 559
A2d 1261 (Del 1989).
57 In re Digex, Inq Shareholders Litigation, 2000 Del Ch LEXIS 171, *112.
58 The work of Robert Daines demonstrates that Delaware's post-1985 legal regime has
not reduced returns to shareholders. See Daines, Does Delaware Law Improve Value? at 26
(cited in note 46). As Professor Daines summarizes his conclusions:
Delaware corporate law improves firm value and facilitates the sale of public firms. Using
Tobin's Q as an estimate of firm value, I find Delaware firms are worth significantly more
than similar firms incorporated elsewhere. The result is robust to controls for firm size, di-
versification, profitability, investment opportunity and industry. Delaware firms also receive
significantly more takeover bids and are significantly more likely to be acquired. Firms with
strong incentives to choose valuable legal regimes are likely to incorporate in Delaware
when they go public. These results suggest that corporate law affects firm value.
Id (abstract). Professor Daines's study, while starting from the premise of the efficient market
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Nevertheless, for reasons that are not supported by history or
practice, " the academic community and activist investors have not
been satisfied with the Delaware solution and the present state of the
law.6 The leading spokesperson for doing away with the pill, Professor
Ronald Gilson, argues that shareholders should be permitted to adopt
a bylaw that repeals a poison pill previously adopted by the corpora-
tion and that prohibits the corporation from adopting a pill in re-
sponse to a hostile takeover bid.1 Professor Gilson would go back to
the 1979-82 debate and essentially come down on the side of the Rule
of Passivity. Without the pill, there is no effective defense against a
hostile takeover, and Professor Gilson would doom all targets to being
acquired by a raider or a white knight. A full explication of Professor
Gilson's thesis and my refutation are available in my response to his
article.6 It also should be noted that in a reply to my response,.' Pro-
theory, nonetheless shows none of the dysfunctional or shareholder-wealth-damaging effects
complained of by others.
59 See, for example, Coates, 54 U Miami L Rev at 7 (cited in note 43) (affirming that there
is no evidence that the poison pill has ever detracted from shareholder economic welfare); J.P
Morgan & Co, Poison Pills and Acquisition Premiums (May 2001) (studying 397 US. transactions
from 1997-2000, representing all announced acquisitions of U.S. publicly traded companies in
excess of $1 billion (both deal and firm value), finding that the median takeover premium paid
for companies that had a rights plan in place was 4 percent higher than for companies that did
not have one. The study notes that a distorting factor during this time period was the influence of
technology companies; premiums paid in transactions involving technology targets were actually
higher at non-pim companies. The takeover premium difference at all nontechnology companies
was 7-5 percent.); J.P. Morgan & Co, Median Control Premiums: Pill v. No Pill (July 1997) (study-
ing three hundred U.S. transactions from 1993 through 1997, representing all transactions over
$500 million in which a majority interest was purchased, finding that the median takeover pre-
mium paid for companies that had a rights plan in place was nearly 10 percent higher than for
companies that did not have one. J.P Morgan further found that in hostile deals during the pe-
riod from 1988 through 1997, the takeover premium paid was 14 percent greater for companies
with rights plans in place.); Georgeson Shareholder, Mergers & Acquisitions: Poison Pills and
Shareholder Value/1992-1996 (1997) ("Georgeson Study") (finding, in a study of 319 takeover
transactions over $250 million between 1992 through 1996, that premiums to acquire companies
that had shareholder rights plans six months prior to the first bid were on average eight percent-
age points higher than premiums paid for target companies without rights plans); Robert Com-
ment and G. William Schwert, Poison or Placebo? Evidence on the Deterrence and Wealth Effects
of Modem Antitakeover Measures, 39 J Fin Econ 3, 31 table 4 (1995) (confirming premium re-
sults).
60 In 1984, total United States merger and acquisition activity was $196 billion, it grew to
$1.7 trillion in 2000, and with the market decline in 2001, fell to $800 billion-still four times the
1984 volume. Thomson Financial Securities Data. Merger and acquisition activity as a percent of
market capitalization has averaged 10 percent since 1985 and averaged 12 percent in 1998-2000.
Goldman Sachs, (Jan 7,2002). Clearly the pill and takeover defenses have not had an adverse ef-
fect on the volume of change of control transactions.
61 See Gilson, Unocal Fifteen Years Later at 3 (cited in note 6) (predicting the demise of
"Delaware law's current pro-election, anti-market bias").
62 See Martin Lipton and Paul K. Rowe, Pills Polls, and Professors, 27 Del J Corp L (forth-
coming 2002).
63 Ronald Gilson, Lipton & Rowe's Apologia for Delaware: A Short Reply, 27 Del J Corp L
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fessor Gilson essentially acknowledges that his fight is not against the
pill's being used to support a "just say no" response to a hostile take-
over bid, but instead against a theoretical construct that the pill per-
mits a "just say never" defense. He argues that the marketplace, in the
form of shareholder pressure on the board of directors, has prevented
the pill from being an absolute bar to a takeover, and therefore the
pill does not function as designed. As the creator and principal propo-
nent of the pill, I think it fair to say that the pill was neither designed
nor intended to be an absolute bar. It was always contemplated that
the possibility of a proxy fight to replace the board would result in the
board's taking shareholder desires into account, but that the delay and
uncertainty as to the outcome of a proxy fight would give the board
the negotiating position it needed to achieve the best possible deal for
all the shareholders, which in appropriate cases could be the target's
continuing as an independent company. The pill and the proxy contest
have proved to yield the perfect balance, both hoped for and intended,
between an acquiror and a target. A board cannot say "never," but it
can say "no" in order to obtain the best deal for its shareholders.6 If
Professor Gilson's price for entente cordiale is a concession that a "de-
sign flaw" in the pill forecloses it from being used to achieve the
never-intended result of enabling a board of directors to totally and
permanently ignore the will of the shareholders and "just say never,"
the Gilson Theatre of the Twenty Years' Pill Wars can now be closed.
A new participant in the debate, Professor John Coates, recogniz-
ing that Delaware would not embrace the Gilsonian views and would
strike down the bylaw Professor Gilson proposes, has advanced three
bylaws that he believes would accomplish the same purpose, yet might
stand a better chance of passing the test of legality in Delaware.6 Ac-
tivist shareholder groups are presently attempting to implement varia-
tions of the Coates approach. Although discussion of the legality of
(forthcoming 2002).
64 See Kahan and Rock, 69 U Chi L Rev at 910 (cited in note 48) ("[T]he ultimate effect of
the pill is akin to 'just say wait."').
65 See Coates and Fais, 56 Bus Law at 1327 (cited in note 7) ("[I]t seems inevitable ... that
shareholder activists will design new forms of bylaw with a better chance of being upheld by the
Delaware courts."). See also note 44.
66 See, for example, Providence Capital, Inc, press release (Sept 20, 2001), available online
at <http://providencecapitalnyc.com> (visited Jan 31,2002) (announcing a seminar on a Director
Nomination By-law Amendment, in which board members would be disqualified from being
renominated if they fail to abide by precatory shareholder votes to eliminate poison pills). Note,
however, that these bylaws may not be legal. See Laurence A. Hamermesh, Corporate Democ-
racy and Stockholder-Adopted By-Laws: Taking Back the Street?, 73 Tulane L Rev 409,437 & nn
123-124, 483 & n 314 (1998) (asserting that bylaws addressing specific business decisions are in-
valid). Hamermesh argues that the "statutes creating general authority to adopt by-laws may not
be construed to permit stockholders to adopt by-laws directly limiting the managerial power of
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these bylaws is outside the scope of this Commentary, there is a seri-
ous question of their validity, as even Professor Coates acknowl-
edges-namely, that the bylaws are in essence conduct-regulating
rather than qualification bylaws.67
Professor Bebchuk, who in 1982 was an advocate of the Rule of
Passivity,63 modified to permit the target's board to seek a white
knight, now accepts the poison pill and acknowledges the right of the
board of directors to deploy it in defense of a hostile takeover bid.
However, he rejects the fundamental premise of Delaware law and
the Household case that if shareholders are dissatisfied with the direc-
tors' response to a takeover bid, their remedy is to vote out the in-
cumbent board and replace it with one that will redeem the pill and
sell the corporation to the raider or a white knight. Rather, his solu-
tion is to change the law to provide that whenever a corporation be-
comes the target of a hostile bid, the board must submit it to a share-
holder referendum. He proposes that if a majority of the outstanding
the board of directors." Id at 419. He concludes that, in the short term, investors will continue to
press forward with bylaw initiatives, but in the long term, state legislation will likely be enacted
to limit stockholders' power to do so. Id at 492.
67 See Hamermesh, 73 Tulane L Rev at 425 & n 71 (cited in note 66) (analogizing corpo-
rate bylaws to acts of a legislature). In a January 28,2002, memorandum to me, Professor Coates
disagreed with my interpretation of the effect of his bylaw proposals. Professor Coates wrote:
I don't agree our bylaw proposals are equivalent to Providence's approach, either legally or
practically. I'm on the record that Providence's approach-linking director qualification to
pill redemption-is likely illegal in Delaware. Our director qualification bylaw would leave
pills intact, preserve the central role of boards in responding to hostile bids, and give man-
agement power to select directors from among a company's largest 25 shareholders. The by-
law would not even indirectly facilitate a hostile bid unless nearly all large shareholders
supported a sale. In practical terms, the bylaw would encourage responsible long-term in-
vesting. In legal terms, the bylaw would allow long-term shareholders-at some cost and ef-
fort on their part-to improve the process by which they elect boards in the ordinary
course, outside the context of hostile bids, and so is directly in line with Moran, Blasius, and
other cases emphasizing the role of shareholder voting. As I don't see our bylaw proposals
as resulting in elimination of defenses, I see no real tension between the proposals and my
earlier work showing that empirical studies haven't proven defenses harmful to shareholder
interests.
Memorandum from John Coates IV to Martin Lipton (Jan 28,2002) (on file with author). I do
not accept Professor Coates's explanation. Although his three proposed bylaws do not directly
result in the "elimination of defenses," as did the first-generation bylaws (such as Professor Gil-
son's), his first two proposals are explicitly intended to facilitate takeovers, and the third-the di-
rector qualification bylaw-is intended to give shareholders a "voice" that is primarily valuable
insofar as it enables the shareholders to facilitate takeovers as members of the board. Even the
article itself is framed as presenting alternative means to achieve the same end as was intended
by the first-generation bylaws.
68 See Bebchuk, 95 Harv L Rev at 1028 (cited in note 3) (arguing that facilitating bidding
interests is desirable for target shareholders and society).
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shares vote in favor of the bid, the board must remove the pill and all
69
other structural takeover defenses.
As originally proposed in 1982, and as approved in the House-
hold decision, the pill contemplated that a board of directors could
not ignore the will of the shareholders with respect to a takeover of-
fer.70 The pill was structured so that it would not interfere with the
right of the shareholders to vote to replace the board and would not
impede a raider from instituting a proxy fight to replace the board.7'
Professor Bebchuk acknowledges in his current work that the fact that
the pill requires hostile bidders to prevail in a proxy contest-what he
calls the "critical consequence of the pill" -is indeed desirable. 7 How-
ever, he wants the decision in the form of a bidder-initiated referen-
dum on the bid, and not on the composition of the board, and at what-
ever time a bidder determines.3
69 See Bebchuk and Ferrell, 87 Va L Rev at 144 (cited in note 1) ("To enable shareholders
to pass judgment on a bid, it is necessary to stop target management from preventing the bid
from ever being considered by shareholders in the first place.").
70 "When the Household Board of Directors is faced with a tender offer and a request to
redeem the rights, they will not be able to arbitrarily reject the offer." Household, 500 A2d at
1354.
71 See, for example, Account v Hilton Hotel Corp, 780 A2d 245,249 (Del 2001) ("[A] rights
plan would not have the unauthorized effect of restricting stockholders' rights to conduct a
proxy contest."), citing Household, 500 A2d at 1355-56. See also In re Gaylord Container Corp
Shareholders Litigation, 753 A2d 462, 470 (Del Ch 2000) ("[The fact that a company has a poi-
son pill in place is less significant because the proxy fight can operate as a substitute for a tender
offer."); Stahl v Apple Bancorp, Inc, 1990 Del Ch LEXIS 121, *17 ("Thus, while the Rights Plan
does deter the formation of proxy efforts of a certain magnitude, it does not limit the voting
power of individual shares.").
72 Lucian Bebchuk and Oliver Hart, Takeover Bids vs. Proxy Fights in Contests for Corpo-
rate Control at 4, Harvard Olin Discussion Paper No 336 (first draft Feb 1999; last revised Oct
2001), available online at <http:l/www.law.harvard.edulprograms/olin-center> (visited Jan 31,
2002).
73 Similarly, the European Commission's Committee of Company Law Experts has con-
cluded that "a rule should be introduced, which allows the bidder to break-through mechanisms
and structures which may frustrate a bid, as defined in the articles of association and related con-
stitutional documents .... The threshold for exercising the break-through right should not be set
at a percentage higher than 75% of the risk-bearing capital of the company." European Commis-
sion, Report of the High Level Group of Company Law Experts on Issues Related to Takeover
Bids 7 (Jan 10, 2002), available online at <http://europa.eu.intlcoim/internalmarketten
company/company/news/hlg0l-2002.pdf> (visited May 2, 2002). However, in explaining their
conclusion, the European Commission's Committee of Company Law Experts noted in a recent
report that U.S. boards of directors are subject to much greater pressure to maximize share-
holder value than are their European counterparts. Id at 40-41. Among the factors cited in sup-
port of this proposition by the Committee of Company Law Experts are the following: U.S.
boards of directors are judged by their performance in the capital markets; they are subject to
pressure from institutional investors; their behavior is painfully public due to disclosure rules
and media attention; they may be replaced in a successful proxy contest; and it is relatively easy
for shareholders to bring derivative suits against them. Id. Further, the Committee argues that
the existing U.S. antitakeover measures arose largely in response to a potential raider's ability to
bid for only a portion of a company's outstanding shares; in Europe, a bidder is required to offer
Pills, Polls, and Professors Redux
Professor Bebchuk's central position is that shareholders should
have the right to vote to replace some or all of the directors or redeem
a poison pill as soon as reasonably practical after a bid is made. Alter-
natively, he supports the enactment of bylaws that would limit the
types of pills that the board may adopt, in order to achieve the same
result. In effect, Professor Bebchuk would turn the clock back to
Chancellor Allen's decision in City Capital Associates Ltd Partnership
v Interco, Inc,74 and then extend the holding in order to remove a stag-
gered board in one election instead of several, or, more directly, to
obviate the need for an election at all.
For the past year, proponents of Professor Bebchuk's referendum
proposal have been citing the fourteen-month resistance by Wil-
lamette to a hostile takeover bid by Weyerhaeuser as an example of
abuse of the pill and staggered board combination. Weyerhaeuser's
first bid was $48 per share, which it subsequently unilaterally raised to
$50 per share prior to commencing a proxy fight. Willamette's position
was that Weyerhaeuser was attempting to acquire it at an inadequate
price that did not reflect its true value. Willamette continued to resist
after shareholders replaced a third of the board with nominees of
Weyerhaeuser committed to a sale of the company and after 64 per-
cent of the shares were tendered to the all-cash, all-shares offer.5 This
gave the pill traducers their best argument-that the combination al-
lows a determined board to deny the will of the shareholders not for
one year, but for two. However, this argument evaporated after Wey-
erhaeuser increased its offer from $50 per share to $55 per share and
finally to $55.50 per share, which the Willamette board finally ac-
cepted as being in the best interests of its shareholders.76 The Weyer-
haeuser-Willamette deal is no less than a shining example of how a
staggered board and poison pill operate to the benefit of sharehold-
ers? The agreed-upon price of $55.50 represents a 16 percent increase
to purchase all outstanding shares at an equitable price. Id at 41.
74 551 A2d 787 (Del Ch 1988).
75 See Jim Carlton and Robin Sidel, Willamette Agrees to Be Bought by Weyerhaeuser, Wall
St J A3 (Jan 22, 2002). See also Stanley Holmes, It's Tme for Willamette to Give in to Weyer-
haeuser, Bus Week 30 (Jan 14,2002) (stating that the merger "makes good strategic sense" and
calling on Willamette to give up the takeover fight).
76 See Darrell Hassler, Weyerhaeuser to Buy Willamette for $Z78 Billion in Cash, Debt,
Bloomberg News (Jan 21, 2002); Bill Virgin, Weyerhaeuser Finally Wins; Willamette Gives In,
Agrees to Be Bought by Rival for $55.50 a Share, Seattle Post-Intelligencer Al (Jan 2, 2002) (in-
cluding a timeline of events in Weyerhaeuser's bid for Willamette).
77 BTR Corporation's 1990 acquisition of Norton Corporation also illustrates how a stag-
gered board affords a board of directors the leverage and time it may need in order to negotiate
effectively with a potential acquiror. In BTR-Norton, shortly before the annual meeting of Nor-
ton at which BTR's nominees were up for election, Governor Dukakis signed a bill amending
the Massachusetts corporation law to mandate that all Massachusetts corporations have a stag-
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over Weyerhaeuser's initial bid, and an 11 percent increase in deal
value even after the conclusion of the first proxy fight. Those who
would credit shareholder choice for the outcome overlook the fact
that in the absence of the staggered board and poison pill, Willamette
shareholders would have "chosen" $48 per share before they ever had
the opportunity to receive $55.50.8
Willamette is typical of the experience of the past twenty years,
during which very few companies have remained independent after a
tender offer combined with a proxy fight to replace the board. The
largely theoretical possibility of continued resistance after loss of a
proxy fight that worries Professor Bebchuk and his followers does not
in any way warrant a change in basic corporate law, which has long
permitted shareholders to enjoy a staggered-board charter that pro-
tects against changes in management predicated on short-term
events." There are strong policy reasons to assure that management
has sufficient time to demonstrate the validity of its strategic plan-
indeed, I have argued that this period should be five years, with a ref-
erendum on the management's performance and the possibility of a
hostile takeover only at the quinquennial election."
There have been a number of instances in which an unsolicited
bid has been coupled with a proxy fight to remove the target's board
and replace it with a board committed to redeeming the target's pill. 1
gered board unless the board determines otherwise. Due to this timely intervention, the Norton
board was able to negotiate an additional $15 per share for its shareholders.
78 Fifty-one percent of the outstanding shares had been tendered into Weyerhaeuser's $48-
per-share offer as bf the February 2, 2001 expiration date. See Weyerhaeuser Extends an Offer,
NY Times C14 (Feb 2,2001).
79 Of the five-thousand-plus U.S. public companies that responded to the 2001-2002
NACD Public Company Governance Survey, 57 percent have a classified board. See National
Association of Corporate Directors, 2001-2002 NACD Public Company Governance Survey 14
(Nov 2001). Further, the survey reveals that "[n]early three-quarters of the initial public offering
companies tracked in 2001 had classified boards." Id. Also, the pill has been adopted by thou-
sands of public companies and has become an essential, commonplace element of the fabric of
corporate governance, with no adverse impact on share prices or merger activity. Academic pre-
scriptions for change would upset widespread and settled expectations and practices, and there-
fore should carry a particularly heavy burden of persuasion. I find nothing in the recent study
undertaken by Professors Bebchuk, Coates and Subramanian that warrants such a change. See
Lucian Arye Bebchuk, John C. Coates IV, and Guhan Subramanian, The Powerfid Antitakeover
Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence & Policy, 54 Stan L Rev (forthcoming 2002).
80 See Lipton and Rosenblum, 58 U Chi L Rev at 224-29 (cited in note 14) ("The five-year
period between election meetings affords directors and managers some measure of freedom
from the short-term focus now imposed on them by institutional stockholders' pressure for quar-
terly results and the ever-present takeover threat."). See Allen, Jacobs, and Strine, 69 U Chi L
Rev at 1096-1100 (cited in note 54), for a modified form of this proposal that has been advanced
for discussion.
81 The poison pill has decisively shifted the battle for corporate control from the arena of
the coercive tender offer to that of the proxy contest. When confronted with a poison pill, a hos-
tile suitor may be forced to make its case by means of a proxy solicitation if it wishes to persuade
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In some cases, the target was acquired by the original bidder, and in
others, the target sought a white knight and was acquired at a higher
price than that offered by the raider that initiated the process. In very
few instances has a target with a staggered board suffered a first-
round loss-had a third of the board replaced with the raider's nomi-
nees-and continued to refuse to surrender its independence. In all
other cases, after a first-round loss, or even before, when it became
clear that the shareholders would vote to replace a third of the board,
the target negotiated a deal. In light of this experience, there does not
appear to be any compelling need to change the law to mandate a
shareholder referendum whenever a raider demands it.
By contrast, Professor Bebchuk's proposal carries with it signifi-
cant dangers. As a practical matter, his proposal, like Professor Gil-
son's and like the 1981 Rule of Passivity proposal, would put a "For
Sale" sign on all public corporations. Though the difference between a
bid-and-referendum and a bid-and-proxy fight may be seen as one of
degree, a referendum would create the critical problem of an open in-
vitation for unsolicited bids. The acquiror would have the assurance of
a vote on the bid, with little chance for the target to do anything other
than declare an auction. Further, the costs of operating as if it were
always for sale would be highly detrimental to a company. In general,
a company that becomes the target of an unsolicited takeover bid
must institute a series of costly programs to protect its business during
the period of uncertainty as to the outcome of the bid. To retain key
employees, in the face of the usual rush of headhunters seeking to
steal away the best employees, expensive bonus and incentive plans
are put in place. To placate concerned customers and suppliers, special
price and order concessions are granted. Communities postpone or
reconsider incentives to retain facilities or obtain new facilities. The
company itself postpones major capital expenditures and new strate-
gic initiatives. Creditors delay commitments and seek protection for
outstanding loans. All of this imposes enormous costs on the target,
which are not recovered no matter what the outcome of the takeover
bid;' if the bidder is successful, the bidder and its shareholders bear
target shareholders that it is truly in their best interests to accept the offer. In addition to Weyer-
haeuser-Willamette, other well-known examples are Georgia-Pacific Corporation's 1989 battle to
acquire Great Northern Nekoosa Corporation, AT&T's 1990 fight to acquire NCR, and IBM's
acquisition of Lotus Development Corporation in 1995. In each case, the target board resisted a
takeover, the acquiror commenced or announced the intention to commence a proxy contest,
and the merger ultimately was consummated at a significantly higher price per share than that
initially offered by the acquiror.
82 See, for example, Simon London, Secrets of a Successful Partnership, Fin Times (Feb 6,
2002) ("Mergers create uncertainty. Top salespeople become recruitment targets for rival com-
panies. Redundancies damage morale. Customers are sensitive to signs that product or service
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these costs; if the target remains independent, the target and its share-
holders bear them. The poison pill alleviates some, but not all, of these
concerns and related costs. To change the law to remove the protec-
tions of the pill and not protect the target against these costs is un-
thinkable.
Professor Bebchuk's attempt to draw support from the decision
of the EU to adopt a referendum-type regulation of unsolicited take-
over bids is not well-founded. The EU specifically recognizes that its
approach is based on a dramatically different set of economic condi-
tions from those in the U.S." Further, the EU approach parallels
closely the "no frustration" of bids approach of the U.K. Takeover
Panel. There is no evidence that corporate performance and corporate
governance in the U.K. are superior to that in the U.S. Indeed, it is
universally recognized that that is not the case.-
Professor Bebchuk's proposal also raises fundamental issues of
inconsistency with the existing corporate law allocation of responsibil-
ity between the shareholders and the board of directors. Professor
Bebchuk would permit either a takeover bid combined with a refer-
endum or a merger proposal that bypasses the target's board and is
submitted directly to the target's shareholders. He would permit both
cash and securities to be offered. No new financial, economic, or juris-
prudential reason is advanced to support this radical change in the
law. As matters now stand, it is an essential part of the statutory
framework of Delaware law and of most, if not all, of the other states
that both the directors and shareholders agree to a sale of the com-
pany before it can occur." In short, Delaware law requires that the
board make a considered determination of the fairness of a bid before
referring to shareholders the question of whether to keep the pill or
other takeover protections in place. Under the Delaware statute, there
is no contemplation of a control change unapproved by a board of di-
rectors. The "shareholder choice" provided by the statute is the right
to choose representatives periodically, not the right of perpetual self-
governance through instant polls or plebiscites. Directors have a duty
quality is slipping.").
83 See note 73.
84 The Committee of Company Law Experts recognizes that it is in effect hanging a "For
Sale" sign on all EU public companies and that EU takeover rules will be virtually the opposite
of those in the United States. The Committee believes that, at this stage of the EU markets and
company consolidation, its recommendations-not the U.S. approach-are what is right for the
EU. There is no doubt that, when the EU rules go into effect, there will be a significant increase
in EU takeover activity. See Report of the High Level Group of Company Law Experts at 38-44
(cited in note 73).
85 Except for a "short-form merger" involving a 90 percent owned subsidiary. See 8 Del
Code Ann § 253 (1991 & Supp 1999).
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to insure that the shareholders get a fair price, and "shareholder
choice" independent of the board is not part of the law of mergers and
acquisitions. The shareholders' right is to elect or replace the board of
directors or to accept or reject a board recommendation.
As the law now stands, when faced with a takeover bid, a board
has the duty to determine whether such bid is at a fair price and in the
shareholders' best interests.u This is not a burden to be taken lightly.
Under Unocal and Unitrin v American General Corp,n' a board of di-
rectors may not merely "assert" that the underlying long-term value of
the corporation exceeds the bid on the table; in the two cases in
which a "just say no" defense was actually tried in court, the directors
were required to show, through detailed presentations and expert tes-
timony, that their position was reasonable and based on appropriate
information.u If a board either does not believe the takeover bid to be
in the best interests of the shareholders, or is unable to make such a
decision, it may not, consistent with its fiduciary duty under Van
Gorkom, Household and Quickturn Design Systems, Inc v
Shapiro/Mentor Graphics Corp v Quicktum Design Systems, Inc," re-
deem the pill to permit the bid to go forward. It is inconsistent with
existing Delaware law for a board, absent a board decision that the
bid is fair, to delegate to shareholders in a referendum the fiduciary
decision of whether to leave the pill or other takeover protections in
place.
There is simply no reason to take the diametric turn in the law
urged by Professor Bebchuk. And even if there were, Professor
Bebchuk drastically underestimates the number and complexity of the
conditions that would need to be applicable to such a referendum in
order to protect the corporation and its shareholders from abusive
bids. First, there would have to be assurance that the purpose of the
bid is to acquire the target rather than to put it in play to profit from a
topping bid. This could be accomplished by requiring that the bid rep-
86 See Van Gorkom, 488 A2d at 875 ("A substantial premium may provide one reason to
recommend a merger, but in the absence of other sound valuation information, the fact of a
premium alone does not provide an adequate basis upon which to assess the fairness of an offer-
ing price.").
87 651 A2d 1361 (Del 1995) (applying Unocal standard to the board's stock purchase plan).
88 Professor Gilson appears to misunderstand the substantive nature of the directors' duty
to consider a takeover bid. See Gilson, Unocal Fifteen Years Later at 13-14 (cited in note 6)
("[T]he Delaware Supreme Court's analysis reduces functionally to a preference that control
contests be resolved through an election, rather than a market.').
89 See Moore v Wallace, 907 F Supp 1545,1549 (D Del 1995) (noting the three day prelimi-
nary injunction record and the voluminous record); Amanda Acquisition Corp v Universal Foods
Corp, 708 F Supp 984,1008-16 (E D Wis 1989).
90 721 A2d 1281 (Del 1998).
91 789 A2d 1216 (Del Ch 2001).
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resent a premium over the current market price equal to not less than
the average of recent comparable acquisition premiums as set forth in
an opinion of a recognized financial advisor. Here there would also be
two subsidiary issues: Should the target be able to dispute the pre-
mium analysis, and should the referendum be denied to a bidder that
has acquired more than 1 percent of the outstanding shares of the tar-
get within the twelve months prior to the bid?
Second, the bid could not be overly conditional. Here the princi-
pal question is the degree of material adverse change that would war-
rant the bidder's terminating the bid and walking away. This is a mat-
ter that has recently been contested in connection with negotiated
takeovers.? To protect the target and its shareholders, the adverse
change condition would have to be triggered only for truly material,
unforeseen events that have a long-term impact and that are com-
pany-specific as distinguished from industry-wide or macroeconomic
events.93
Third, the obviously necessary condition that the bidder obtain
regulatory approval raises another difficult issue: How far should the
bidder have to go to obtain regulatory approval, and how much time
should be allowed for it to do so? Since the bidder initiates a unilat-
eral process that it knows will be very disruptive and costly to the tar-
get, the bidder would have to be required to use its best efforts, includ-
ing agreeing to any divestitures, business restrictions, or expenditures
that are necessary to obtain regulatory approval. If it failed to do so,
the bidder would be obligated to the target for liquidated damages in
an amount equal to a percentage of the offer price sufficient to com-
pensate for the damages caused by the disruption." This could, for ex-
92 Two of the most highly publicized transactions of 2001 include Tyson Foods's acquisition
of IBP, see, for example, Herbert Henryson, IBP v. Tyson Teaches Valuable Lessons, NY L J 1
(July 26, 2001), and WPP Group's acquisition of Tempus Group, see, for example, Jean
Eaglesham, Ruling Sets High Hurdle for 'MAC Clauses" The Takeover Panel Has Left Little
Room for Manoeuvre, Fin Times 24 (Nov 7,2001). Both Tyson and WPP tried to walk away from
their deals on the basis of material adverse change conditions in the merger agreements. In each
case, a court ruled that the intervening events cited by the acquiror did not constitute sufficient
justification for terminating the merger agreement and ordered that the merger be consum-
mated.
93 Indeed, after the Tyson case, more attention than ever is being paid to material-adverse-
condition provisions in merger agreements. "What might have been boilerplate before may now
be a point of negotiations." Jaret Seiberg, A Legal Beef, Tyson's Big MAC Attack on IBP Re-
shaped M&A Law, Daily Deal 15 (Jan 18,2002) (quoting Lawrence Hamermesh).
94 The ill-fated attempt by General Electric to acquire Honeywell International in 2001 is a
situation that received a great deal of attention in which the failure to obtain required regulatory
approvals doomed a merger. GE made an unsolicited $55-per-share proposal to Honeywell while
the Honeywell board of directors was concluding a special meeting called to approve an exten-
sively negotiated merger with United Technologies at $50 per share. See, for example, Neal St.
Anthony, Honeywell's Path to Deal Now Subject to Question, Star Trib 1D (Oct 29, 2000).The GE
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ample, equal 5 percent of the aggregate bid. If the time period during
which regulatory approval is being sought is more than six months,
and thereafter the raider fails to get the approval, the liquidated dam-
ages could be increased by, say, one percent per month to compensate
for the greater damage inflicted on the target by the longer period of
disruption from uncertainty as to the future of the target. Even with
further compensation, it would be necessary to specify a final expira-
tion date that could not be greater than, say, nine months. A related is-
sue is the limitation on the bidder's ability to negotiate with regula-
tors, who would be aware of the strictures imposed by the statutory
referendum procedure.
A fourth set of issues involves the proposed consideration. Where
all or part of the bid consideration is cash, the bidder would be re-
quired to furnish assurance that it has the cash on hand or a loan
commitment from a major financial institution that is not qualified by
a material adverse change condition that is different from the material
adverse change condition in the bid.
Where all or part of the bid consideration is securities, the bidder
would be required to make the bid through a registered securities
dealer. The securities dealer would have "underwriter" liability under
Section 11 of the Securities Act7 and would be expected to perform
customary due diligence. Underwriter's liability and due diligence are
not perfect safeguards, but they represent the minimum protection
that should be afforded to the target's shareholders against the pitfalls
of Professor Bebchuk's argument that the market effectively deter-
mines the value of the bid to the target's shareholders, who need only
compare the pre-bid share price and the value of the bid.9 After all, in
almost every case, it would be impossible for all the target's share-
holders to convert all the securities received in the bid into cash at the
price on the day the tender offer is consummated. Moreover, share-
holders lack information that careful due diligence might reveal; a
year ago, for example, Enron stock providing a 20 percent or better
merger agreement was signed within two days of the proposal's having been made. But though
the US. Department of Justice would have permitted the merger, the European Competition
Commission rejected GE's divestiture proposal as insufficient, and the parties ultimately can-
celed their merger agreement. See, for example, Neal R. Stoll and Shepard Goldfein, A Tale of
Two Regulators, NY L J 3 (July 17, 2001). Upon termination of the merger agreement, GE
agreed to pay Honeywell $100 million to cover expenses related to the merger. See Honeywell
International Merger with GE Off, Appliance Manufacturer 18 (Nov 1, 2001). However, on Oc-
tober 2, 2001, the day that GE and Honeywell announced the termination of their merger agree-
ment, Honeywell stock closed at $38.05 per share, 30 percent lower than the $55 per share value
of the GE deal and a total of more than $13 billion lower than the GE bid, and more than $9
billion lower than the United Technologies bid.
95 15 USC § 77k (1994).
96 See Bebchuk and Hart, Takeover Bids vs Proxy Fights at 30 (cited in note 72).
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premium would have been considered a "great deal" by the share-
holders of most target companies.9
Bidders and the banks that finance and advise them will un-
doubtedly have trouble with these protections for the target and its
shareholders. The difficulty of achieving an appropriate balance be-
tween the interests of a bidder and those of the target and its share-
holders in designing such a bid and referendum structure illustrates
that mergers, acquisitions, takeovers, and proxy fights and the legal
rules applicable to them are complex, with many interdependent vari-
ables. As Professors Marcel Kahan and Edward Rock demonstrate in
their current work, the relationship between corporate law and pri-
vate ordering is highly dynamic, with each change resulting in numer-
ous and often unforeseen responses." That is why, instead of a system
of inflexible statutory rules, we have developed a system of negotia-
tion-with the target board and the bidder as the primary negotiating
counterparties. It is important to preserve the board's role as the best
negotiator on behalf of the shareholders and not leap headlong into a
new regime that has the potential to be seriously disruptive to busi-
ness and the economy. But to be an effective negotiator-and the re-
cord shows that, on balance, boards have been 9-the board needs the
fundamental power of any successful negotiator: the ability to "just
say no" and walk away. The poison pill provides that power, which is
why the pill is legal and why it enables directors to do their job effec-
tively.
CONCLUSION
I developed the poison pill to protect against tender offers struc-
tured by raiders with terms that were inimical to the interests of
shareholders, or which under certain circumstances would become in-
imical to shareholders. I put that tool in the hands of the board of di-
rectors as the only corporate organ that could act to protect both the
corporation and the shareholders, with those actions subject to the
power of a court to ensure that they met the business judgment rule
test. As the foregoing discussion of the type of conditions that would
be necessary to protect targets and their shareholders in a referendum
regime demonstrates, the shareholders would be at a serious disadvan-
tage if they did not have such statutory conditions or the board to ne-
gotiate terms on their behalf.
97 A comprehensive summary of Enron's dramatic collapse is set forth in A Chronology of
Enron's Recent Woes, Wall St J C12 (Jan 16, 2002).
98 See Kahan and Rock, 69 U Chi L Rev at 900-01 (cited in note 48).
99 See Georgeson Study (cited in note 59).
1064 [69:1037
Pills, Polls, and Professors Redux
As the pill approaches its twentieth birthday, it is under attack
from three groups of professors, each advocating a different form of
shareholder poll, but each intended to eviscerate the protections af-
forded by the pill. The Gilsonians urge the shareholders to approve a
bylaw amendment invalidating the pill; the Coatesites would have the
shareholders amend bylaws to accomplish the equivalent of invalidat-
ing the pill; and the Bebchukers would preserve the pill just long
enough for the shareholders to invalidate it in a concurrent tender of-
fer and referendum. Each of these three schools makes a strenuous ef-
fort to distinguish itself from the other two and to deny that it advo-
cates a radical change in the law. Each also exalts shareholder democ-
racy and choice: Gilsonians and Coatesites ex ante, and Bebchukers ex
post. None of the three presents any real evidence to support the as-
sertion that its approach is better than the others, and none addresses
the cardinal issue of the cost to corporations and the economy as a
whole if corporations are stripped of their takeover defenses and are
at all times for sale.
Upon reflection, I think it fair to conclude that the three schools
of academic opponents of the pill are not really opposed to the idea
that the staggered board of the target of a hostile takeover bid may
use the pill to "just say no." Rather, their fundamental disagreement is
with the theoretical possibility that the pill may enable a staggered
board to "just say never." However, as the recent Willamette situation
and almost every other in which a takeover bid was combined with a
proxy fight show, the incidence of a target's actually saying "never" is
so rare as not to be a real-world problem. While each of these profes-
sors' attempts to undermine the protections of the pill is argued with
force and considerable logic, none of their arguments comes close to
overcoming the cardinal rule of public policy-particularly applicable
to corporate law and corporate finance-"If it ain't broke, don't fix
it."
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